Era Nietzsche um relativista conservador ou, pelo contrário, seria possível alocar o filósofo no sítio teórico do pensamento crítico? Tal pergunta-problema delimita o presente artigo. Ela se refere a uma conhecida querela entre modelos interpretativos (SEBOLD, [20--?]) pós-modernos e naturalistas e, especificamente, deriva da revisão de literatura de uma pesquisa em andamento, realizada no âmbito do curso de doutorado do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Educação da Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, a partir da qual observamos uma ausência, talvez um esquecimento (...) em relação à contribuição de Nietzsche para a filosofia crítica no campo da Educação, espaço acadêmico no qual as pesquisas, em grande medida, alinham-se à recepção relativista de seu pensamento. A hipótese central, comprovada pela análise de posições filosóficas de Nietzsche (1979; 1992a; 1992b; 1998; 2000; 2003; 2004) e de alguns de seus comentadores, considera que o filósofo é um pensador crítico (HEIT, 2018; HEIT; PICHLER, 2015), não relativista (MARTON, 2011), perspectivista (CORBANEZI, 2013; MATTOS, 2013) e adepto a um tipo perspectivístico de naturalismo (CARVALHO, 2018; HEIT, 2016; HEIT, 2015; ITAPARICA, 2018), traços que de certa forma tendem a impactar a cosmovisão, quase hegemônica, no que diz respeito à recepção nietzschiana no campo da educação. O objetivo central do artigo é destacar que a discussão destes aspectos pode levar a um reposicionamento da filosofia de Nietzsche no universo do pensamento contemporâneo, incluindo-se aí a pesquisa em educação, bem como compreender em que medida a perspectiva crítica se choca com a perspectiva relativista no que diz respeito à teorização de uma formação de caráter emancipatório. Em termos metodológicos, a análise da revisão de literatura recorre à hermenêutica crítica. (shrink)

Resumo: Era Nietzsche um inimigo da ciência? A pergunta-problema deste artigo é justamente o título de uma conferência proferida pelo Dr. Helmut Heit (Kolleg Friedrich Nietzsche - Klassik Stiftung Weimar) no Seminário de Filosofia da Ciência do Instituto Federal do Espírito Santo, campus Linhares, em 9 de dezembro de 2014. Uma famosa versão do senso comum acadêmico apresenta Nietzsche como inimigo mortal das ciências. Sabe-se, contudo, que o filósofo manteve uma relação intensa, duradoura e necessária com o campo científico. A (...) partir de fontes primárias e de posicionamentos adotados por pesquisadores especializados, no presente estudo conclui-se que Nietzsche foi concomitantemente um entusiasta do método científico – em função da possibilidade de naturalização e de historicização da produção de conhecimento – e um crítico da fundamentação dogmática das ciências de seu tempo. A caracterização de Nietzsche como pensador crítico-perspectivista (não relativista) está desenvolvida em um artigo inédito de nossa autoria. Palavras-chave: Nietzsche; Ciência; Nietzsche e as ciências. On Nietzsche's necessary critical-perspectivist adherence to the sciences Abstract: Was Nietzsche an enemy of science? The problem question of this article is precisely the title of a lecture given by Dr. Helmut Heit (Kolleg Friedrich Nietzsche - Klassik Stiftung Weimar), presented at the Philosophy of Science Seminar of the Federal Institute of Espírito Santo, Linhares campus, on December 9, 2014. A famous version of academic common sense presents Nietzsche as the mortal enemy of science. It is known, however, that the philosopher maintained an intense, lasting and necessary relationship with the scientific field. From the use of primary sources and the positions adopted by specialized researchers, in the present study, it is concluded that Nietzsche was concomitantly an enthusiast of the scientific method - due to the possibility of naturalization and historicization of the production of knowledge – and a critic of the scientific method. dogmatic foundation of the sciences of his time. The characterization of Nietzsche as a critical-perspectivist (non-relativist) thinker is developed in an unpublished article of our authorship. Key-words: Nietzsche; Science; Nietzsche and the Sciences. Sobre la necesaria adhesión crítico-perspectivista de Nietzsche a las ciencias Resumen: ¿Nietzsche era enemigo de la ciencia? La pregunta problema de este artículo es precisamente el título de una conferencia del Prof. Dr. Helmut Heit (Universidad de Berlín), presentado en el Seminario de Filosofía de la Ciencia del Instituto Federal de Espírito Santo, campus Linhares, el 9 de diciembre de 2014. Si bien Nietzsche llegó a ser catalogado como positivista (MIGNONI, 2017), una famosa versión académica lo presenta como el enemigo mortal de las ciencias. Se sabe, sin embargo, que el filósofo mantuvo una relación intensa, duradera y necesaria con el campo científico. A partir del uso de fuentes primarias y de las posiciones adoptadas por investigadores especializados, en el presente estudio se concluye que Nietzsche fue concomitantemente un entusiasta del método científico – por la posibilidad de naturalización e historización de la producción del conocimiento – y un crítico del fundamento dogmatico de las ciencias de su tiempo. La caracterización de Nietzsche como pensador crítico-perspectivista (no relativista) se desarrolla en un artículo inédito de nuestra autoria. Palabras clave: Nietzsche. Ciencia. Nietzsche y las Ciencias. Nietzsche en la Investigación en Educación. (shrink)

La pandemia COVID-19 ha planteado retos, donde las TIC se ha convertido en una necesidad básica para la humanidad, en este contexto se cuestionó las capacidades de los docentes para hacer frente a los cambios. Tiene una metodología mixta pre- experimental, participaron 49 docentes y se aplicó cuestionario, rubrica y Pre Test/Post Test, con valores 0.890; 0.91, 0.97 de Cronbach. Los hallazgos demostraron que las dimensiones, comunicación, creación de contenidos, resultaron muy altas, mientras que la dimensión seguridad y solución de (...) problemas resultaron ser buenas. La investigación obtuvo resultados significativos para el desarrollo de las competencias digitales de los docentes de Piura. (shrink)

Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.

In this paper I respond to three commentaries on Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. In response to Alcoff, I primarily defend my conception of how an individual hearer might develop virtues of epistemic justice. I do this partly by drawing on empirical social psychological evidence supporting the possibility of reflective self-regulation for prejudice in our judgements. I also emphasize the fact that individual virtue is only part of the solution – structural mechanisms also have an essential role (...) in combating epistemic injustice. My response to Goldberg principally concerns my perceptual account of the epistemology of testimony, which I defend as being both well-motivated and best categorized as a species of non-inferentialism. I also explain its relation to the reductionism/non-reductionism contrast, and defend my resistance to casting it as any kind of default view. In response to Hookway, I contrast discriminatory with distributive forms of epistemic injustice, and defend the basic taxonomy I present in the book, which casts testimonial and hermeneutical injustice as the two fundamental discriminatory forms of epistemic injustice. (shrink)

Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism—the ‘relativism of distance’. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical. I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams's moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame, which says that when an agent's moral shortcomings by our (...) lights are a matter of their living according to the moral thinking of their day, judgements of blame are out of order. Finally, I will propose a form of moral judgement we may sometimes quite properly direct towards historically distant agents when blame is inappropriate—moral-epistemic disappointment. Together these two proposals may help release us from the grip of the idea that moral appraisal always involves the potential applicability of blame, and so from a key source of the relativist idea that moral appraisal is inappropriate over distance. (shrink)

When we hope to explain and perhaps vindicate a practice that is internally diverse, philosophy faces a methodological challenge. Such subject matters are likely to have explanatorily basic features that are not necessary conditions. This prompts a move away from analysis to some other kind of philosophical explanation. This paper proposes a paradigm based explanation of one such subject matter: blame. First, a paradigm form of blame is identified—‘Communicative Blame’—where this is understood as a candidate for an explanatorily basic form (...) of blame. Second, its point and purpose in our lives is investigated and found to reside in its power to increase the alignment of the blamer and the wrongdoer's moral understandings. Third, the hypothesis that Communicative Blame is an explanatorily basic form of blame is tested out by seeing how far other kinds of blame can reasonably be understood as derivative, especially in respect of blame's point and purpose. Finally, a new and quasi-political worry about blame is raised. (shrink)

Moral intensity theory is used to explain how characteristics of moral issues affect ethical decision-making. According to moral intensity theory, individuals and firms will make more ethical decisions when moral intensity is present, such as greater negative consequences, including harm to customers. However, evidence suggests this does not always happen in crisis situations. For example, Fisher Price waited until 30 babies died before recalling its Rock’n Play Sleeper in 2019. In this article, the concept of immoral entrenchment is introduced to (...) address how crises affect the expected firm responses to morally intense ethical issues. Immoral entrenchment suggests that firms experience threat-rigidity responses to crises that lead to collective moral disengagement. Immoral entrenchment results in firms’ denial of responsibility and unethical behavior, instead of ethical behavior, in the face of highly negative consequences. The study in this article tests immoral entrenchment in the context of the speed to recall 843 consumer products. Supplemental qualitative evidence illustrates the collective moral disengagement dimension of immoral entrenchment. Contributing to the literature on ethics and crisis, the findings demonstrate that crises can generate immoral entrenchment in firms, which reverses the expected ethical response of those firms to issues with high moral intensity. (shrink)

I shall first briefly revisit the broad idea of ‘epistemic injustice’, explaining how it can take either distributive or discriminatory form, in order to put the concepts of ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’ in place. In previous work I have explored how the wrong of both kinds of epistemic injustice has both an ethical and an epistemic significance—someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower. But my present aim is to show that this wrong can also have a political (...) significance in relation to non-domination, and so to freedom. While it is only the republican conception of political freedom that presents nondomination as constitutive of freedom, I shall argue that non-domination is best understood as a thoroughly generic liberal ideal of freedom to which even negative libertarians are implicitly committed, for non-domination is negative liberty as of right—secured non-interference. Crucially on this conception, non-domination requires that the citizen can contest interferences. Pettit specifies three conditions of contestation, each of which protects against a salient risk of the would-be contester not getting a ‘proper hearing’. But I shall argue that missing from this list is anything to protect against a fourth salient threat: the threat that either kind of epistemic injustice might disable contestation by way of an unjust deflation of either credibility or intelligibility. Thus we see that both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice can render a would-be contester dominated. Epistemic justice is thereby revealed as a constitutive condition of non-domination, and thus of a central liberal political ideal of freedom. (shrink)

There are two kinds of forgiveness that appear as radically different from one another: one presents forgiveness as essentially earned through remorseful apology; the other presents it as fundamentally non-earned—a gift. The first, which I label Moral Justice Forgiveness, adopts a stance of moral demand and conditionality; the second, which I label Gifted Forgiveness, adopts a stance of non-demand and un-conditionality. Each is real; yet how can two such different responses to wrongdoing be of one and the same kind? This (...) paper explains how, by showing that the basic role each plays in moral-social life is the same; and that one is conceptually and therefore historically prior to the other. The result is pluralism, with each kind of forgiveness represented as distinctive in both its psychology and its normativity; and yet an ordered pluralism—with Moral Justice Forgiveness revealed as the root kind, and Gifted Forgiveness a culturally contingent iteration. (shrink)

She was to a degree the tool of her husband. However, despite the fact she was under his influence to a degree she cannot escape if the Bank took all reasonable steps to ensure that she had appreciated and understood what she was signing. It may be that Mrs Wright-Bailey did not have an adequate comprehension of the nature of the charge... [E]ven if she did not, the Bank did take all reasonable steps.

Autoscopic phenomena are complex experiences that include the visual illusory reduplication of one’s own body. From a phenomenological point of view, we can distinguish three conditions: autoscopic hallucinations, heautoscopy, and out-of-body experiences. The dysfunctional pattern involves multisensory disintegration of personal and extrapersonal space perception. The etiology, generally either neurological or psychiatric, is different. Also, the hallucination of Self and own body image is present during dreams and differs according to sleep stage. Specifically, the representation of the Self in REM dreams (...) is frequently similar to the perception of Self in wakefulness, whereas in NREM dreams, a greater polymorphism of Self and own body representation is observed. The parallels between autoscopic phenomena in pathological cases and the Self-hallucination in dreams will be discussed to further the understanding of the particular states of self awareness, especially the complex integration of different memory sources in Self and body representation. (shrink)

This paper explores the relation between rational authority and social power, proceeding by way of a philosophical genealogy derived from Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. The position advocated avoids the errors both of the 'traditionalist' (who regards the socio-political as irrelevant to epistemology) and of the 'reductivist' (who regards reason as just another form of social power). The argument is that a norm of credibility governs epistemic practice in the state of nature, which, when socially manifested, is (...) likely to imitate the structures of social power. A phenomenon of epistemic injustice is explained, and the politicizing implication for epistemology educed. (shrink)

The concept of ‘the Canadian identity’ is a topic which has received much attention in recent decades, stimulating discussions on the topic of what makes a Canadian a Canadian? Today, being Canadian might suggest a love of hockey and poutine. However, a century ago, being “Canadian” was an emphasis on adapting or conforming to British norms. This paper will focus on one important theme in debates around ‘Canadianization’, specifically its reflection over time in the domestic structure of the early Ukrainian (...) settlers. Canadian identity studies can especially benefit from this trace of identity formation, by its application to a broader, multi-ethnical context. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to provide a logical reconstruction of the Marxian Theory of Value. This reconstruction is based upon the concept of abstract as opposed to that of homogeneous labor. Abstract labour is a social relation that holds in a market economy, (at least) whenever the profit rate is uniform; it consists in a comparison of the different labors through the exchange relationship. The author proved in a different place (see García de la Sienra, 1987) that (...) there exists a mathematical representation of abstract labor which is unique up to similarity transformations. The existence of this function — which is none other than the value function — is the basis of the present axiomatization, which includes detailed reconstructions of two of the most important models of the theory. (shrink)

Taking on topics from pornography and prostitution to female genital mutilation, from womens magazines and marriage to sexual violence, contributors in this collection argue that the kind of liberal feminism currently rising to prominence does little to challenge the status quo.

No Brasil, diversos grupos de pesquisa apresentam interesse em aprofundar a Educação em outros países latinoamericanos. A presente pesquisa forma parte do grupo “Filosofia e Educação” (Educogitans), Universidade Regional de Blumenau (FURB), Blumenau, Santa Catarina, Brasil, que tem interesse em aprofundar a problemática epistemológica educacional latino americana. Colômbia é um dos países com uma expressiva produção sobre a referida problemática. Assim, o objetivo da presente pesquisa é identificar e analisar algumas concepções de cientificidade no pensamento epistemológico da educação na Colômbia. (...) Visa aprofundar as concepções de Ciências da Educação por parte de autores colombianos. Também se aprofundará em como consideram o objeto da epistemologia e sua importância para a América Latina. Os dados foram coletados mediante os levantamentos bibliográficos e documentais e interpretados no contexto das perspectivas da epistemologia da Educação na América Latina. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to attack some of the conceptual problems that arise when the framework of mathematical learning theory is applied to the description of the behavior of the firm, in setting prices and production quotas, in a competitive market. The goal is to depict the process by which the firm fixes prices and production quotas as a stochastic learning process. A solution to such problems is proposed which is based on statistical-decision concepts. The conceptualization of (...) the behavior of the firm by means of concepts pertaining to mathematical learning theory gives rise to certain mathematical problems, which are formulated here in rather precise terms. (shrink)

We gain information from collective, often institutional bodies all the time—from the publications of committees, news teams, or research groups, from web sites such as Wikipedia, and so on—but do these bodies ever function as genuine group testifiers as opposed to mere group sources of information? In putting the question this way I invoke a distinction made, if briefly, by Edward Craig, which I believe to be of deep significance in thinking about the distinctiveness of the speech act of testimony. (...) The distinction is that between somebody’s functioning as a ‘good informant’ and their functioning merely as a ‘source of information’. The difference between these has, as he remarks, a crucial ethical aspect: What I have in mind is the special flavour of situations in which human beings treat each other as subjects with a common purpose, rather than as objects from which services, in this case true belief, can be extracted. In this paper I shall try to bring out the distinctive nature of the role of good informant in a way that helps to clarify what is at stake in asking whether there can be group testimony in the sense of genuinely collective testimony—that is to say, where the group testifier is a collective and not merely a sum of individuals testifying in one or another form of aggregated chorus. (shrink)

The dual aim of this article is to reveal and explain a certain phenomenon of epistemic injustice as manifested in testimonial practice, and to arrive at a characterisation of the anti–prejudicial intellectual virtue that is such as to counteract it. This sort of injustice occurs when prejudice on the part of the hearer leads to the speaker receiving less credibility than he or she deserves. It is suggested that where this phenomenon is systematic it constitutes an important form of oppression. (...) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]. (shrink)

El «mundo entero» vive un gran desasosiego al estar inmiscuido en la dominación de la Naturaleza sustentada en la gran inversión económica, desde el paradigma antropocéntrico neoliberal. El objetivo del presente trabajo es reconocer y abrazar epistemologías y metodologías alternativas, entre ellas validar las contribuciones de los pueblos indígenas (PI) como protagonistas de la sustentabilidad y soberanía alimentaria. La investigación es de corte documental y la reflexión personal de más de 20 años de labor junto a los PI en Mesoamérica (...) y los Andes. Valorar dichas contribuciones, es centrarse en sus acervos y corpus cognoscitivos, antes que sea tarde. Son los sabios guardianes de la sustentabilidad biocultural de la Naturaleza y la Vida. Se concluye principalmente que son quienes conocen las claves, llaves y secretos que dan respuesta al reto de estelarizar la sustentabilidad y seguridad alimentaria global, que tanto persigue la humanidad. La sociedad en general y en particular las instancias oficiales, formativas, políticas, corporativas, industriales, de extensión y académicas, deben distinguir a estos actores sociales que soportan hoy la seguridad alimentaria mundial. El hallazgo principal cual severa advertencia, es que al «desaparecer» estaríamos ante un fenómeno descomunal de inseguridad alimentaria mundial. (shrink)

For many autistic performers in arts and entertainment, the stage can be an important site of self-advocacy and creative expression. Whereas everyday social interactions may be unpredictable, being onstage can allow autistic performers to work from a script and anticipate audience responses. This article explores the affordances and challenges of performance for young autistic adults in Canada through interviews with four autistic performers. While solo performance was the focus, participants discussed the creative employment of diverse media platforms, from the stage (...) to screenwriting and children’s books, and emphasized the need for autistic people to be involved in all creative realms. This research follows a Critical Disability Studies framework which challenges deficit models of autism, “supercrip” tropes, and narratives of overcoming autism. While one participant noted being uncomfortable with the sense that they were a source of inspiration for non-autistic audiences, each found it encouraging that autistic audiences relate to their work and might be motivated to participate in similar forms of self-advocacy; in particular, they noted the value of performance in building confidence. As previous CDS literature is wary of disability as spectacle, this research provides insight into how young autistic adults use their work onstage and behind the scenes to promote and perform self-advocacy. (shrink)

In both social science and medicine, research on reproduction generally focuses on women. In this article, we examine how men’s reproductive contributions are understood. We develop an analytic framework that brings together Cynthia Daniels’ conceptualization of reproductive masculinity with a staged view of reproduction, where the stages include the period before conception, conception, gestation, and birth. Drawing on data from two medical sites that are oriented to the period before pregnancy, we examine how gendered knowledge about reproduction produces different reproductive (...) equations in different stages of the reproductive process. We conclude with a new research agenda that emerges from rethinking the role of men and masculinity in reproduction. (shrink)

[T]he dominated live in a world structured by others for their purposes — purposes that at the very least are not our own and that are in various degrees inimical to our development and even existence.We are perhaps used to the idea that there are various species of oppression: political, economic, or sexual, for instance. But where there is the phenomenon that Nancy Hartsock picks out in saying that the world is “structured” by the powerful to the detriment of the (...) powerless, there is another species of oppression at work, one that has not been registered in mainstream epistemology: epistemic oppression. The word ‘structured’ may be read materially, so as to imply that social institutions and practices favour the powerful, or ontologically, so as to imply that the powerful somehow constitute the world. But for present purposes I am interested only in an epistemological reading, which implies that the powerful have some sort of unfair advantage in “structuring” our understandings of the social world. I will try to present an account of what this initially vague idea involves. I hope thereby to explain an exact sense in which the powerful can have a kind of epistemic advantage that means the powerless are epistemically oppressed. (shrink)

Interpreting Bernard Williams’s ethical philosophy is not easy. His style is deceptively conversational; apparently direct, yet argumentatively inexplicit and allusive. He is moreover committed to evading ready-made philosophical “-isms.” All this reinforces the already distinct impression that the structure of his philosophy is a web of interrelated commitments where none has unique priority. Against this impression, however, I will venture that the contours of his philosophy become clearest if one considers that there is a single, unchanging root conviction from which (...) his ethical philosophy grows. Despite the perpetual motion of his philosophical thought—its erudition, originality, range, and unceasing forward momentum—still, I contend, there is something unchanging at the heart of it. I will show this by reference to three signature theses: internal reasons, the relativism of distance, and the porous borders of philosophy and history. I will argue that the root conviction of which these are the fruits is the conviction that the constraints of universal rationality seriously underdetermine how one should live. This, I believe, is the vision of the human ethical condition that constitutes the largely inexplicit yet utterly fundamental presupposition beneath Williams’s ethical philosophy taken as a whole. I label the object of this root conviction ethical freedom, and thus portray Williams as a philosopher of ethical freedom. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende mostrar la convivencia de dos estructuras de pensamiento en la escolástica española y, especialmente, en Suárez. Vitoria presenta una visión comunitaria del orden internacional y sus enseñanzas serán transmitidas a Suárez, quien, al contrario, presenta una visión societaria del orden internacional. Esta diferencia no es una casualidad, sino un auténtico cambio de paradigma en el sabio granadino, que hace de él un autor más próximo a la modernidad que a la tradición escolástica. Gracias a un estudio comparado (...) mostraremos el punto de inflexión que supone Suárez en el tránsito hacia la modernidad y su idea de un orden mundial fundado en una sociedad de Estados. (shrink)

Dreaming can be explained as the product of an interaction among memory processes, elaborative processes, and phenomenal awareness. A feedback circuit is activated by this interaction according to the associative links and the requirements of the dream scene. Recently, it has been hypothesized that a partial similarity exists between dreaming and mind wandering and that these two processes may involve the same neural default network. This commentary discusses the differences and similarities between phenomenal consciousness during dreaming and phenomenal consciousness during (...) mind wandering from the perspective of the “continuity” of engagement of cognitive systems. The greatest difference consists in the lack of reality testing during dreaming. Dream imagery is hallucinatory by nature. Consequently, the simulated world in dreams makes dream imagery more akin to perception. In contrast, the imagery of mind wandering is more similar to imagination. The level of meta-awareness is preserved more frequ... (shrink)